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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, VOTING, AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT: A UNIFIED APPROACH
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.*
Abstract-A presidential vote function and a presidential
approval ratings function are jointly estimated for U.S. postwar observations. The estimation technique treats the two
equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal
numbers of observations. Cross-equation restrictions implying
that voters and poll respondents use identical standards in
judging the economic performance of incumbents are imposed
and tested. Estimates show that both votes and approval
ratings are influenced by GNP growth and inflation. The
results suggest that poll respondents are more inflation averse
than voters; however, tests of this hypothesis are not conclusive.

is agreement that macroeconomic isTHERE
1 sues "matter" for political evaluations, but
how they matter is not fully understood. Differing
theoretical perspectives underlie some disagreements, and inherent data limitations have provided further obstacles to consensus. This paper
focuses on issues related to data limitations and
adopts a method for efficiently using data which
are available.
By empirically linking the time series for an
incumbent party's vote share to key economic
indicators, one can gain information about how
voters evaluate economic performance. In wellknown studies, Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978,
1982, 1988) have analyzed congressional and presidential elections in this manner. Other studies of
U.S. voting outcomes have also followed this general research strategy.'
Despite the appeal of this method, one limitation is notable. If one restricts attention to the
post-war period for the United States, there are
only 11 observations for presidential election outcomes, and only 22 observations for congressional
elections. It is difficult to draw clear inferences
about the influence of economic events on elec-
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tions given this paucity of data. Fair and Kramer
tackled this problem by expanding their sample
periods backward in time. For example, Fair
(1988) makes use of 18 presidential election observations beginning with the 1916 election. This
modestly expands the sample but it also introduces additional perils. Economic data are less
reliable for the pre-war period, and voter attitudes about government responsibility for economic conditions are likely to have changed over
the course of the century. The idiosyncrasies of
two world wars and an unparalleled depression
also lead one to question the appropriateness of
including earlier observations.
Other researchers have avoided the observation shortage problem by investigating an alternative time series: poll evaluations of presidential
performance. For about 40 years, the Gallup Poll
has periodically asked respondents whether they
approve or disapprove of the incumbent president's handling of his job. Survey results are
available for quarterly (or even more frequent)
periods, and provide a reasonably long time series which can be linked to economic performance indicators. Many studies have done so;
Hibbs (1982a, 1982b, 1987) provides notable recent examples.2
Unfortunately, poll data also have limitations.
Respondents may have little incentive to respond
accurately to survey questions.3 Even if respondents are truthful, the question posed by the
survey is not identical to that of vote choice. The
poll question focuses attention on current and
past incumbent performance, while voting presumably involves some comparison of alternative
future prospects. Moreover, respondent interpretations of poll questions apparently vary over the

2
Paldam's (1981) review and the recent paper of Dua and
Smyth (1989) together provide a comprehensive listing of such
studies.
3Chilton (1989) shows that poll respondents may have incentives to misrepresent their true preferences.
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I. An Econometric Model for Voting and
electoral cycle, requiring additional care in the
Political Support
specification of an empirical model.
One striking feature of the literature on vote
I specify a two equation model with one equafunctions and political support functions (i.e., aption determining presidential approval ratings and
proval ratings functions) is that almost all studies
the other presidential voting:
are restricted to the analysis of either voting or
poll responses.4 This is so even though many
(la)
At =a + bSt + cXt + et
researchers apparently view the two data sources
as good substitutes for one another, and implic+ St + yZt + ut,
(lb)
Vt =
itly accept the premise that vote functions and
political support functions are manifestations of
the same underlying behavior. If this premise is where
correct, it is sensible to use both data sources
At= the percentage answering "approve" in
rather than to discard one or the other.
response to the survey question: "Do you
In this paper, I jointly estimate vote and politiapprove or disapprove of the way that
cal support functions for U.S. presidents. Assumis handling his job as president?,"
ing that voters and survey respondents evaluate
Vt= the percentage of the two-party vote faeconomic conditions according to the same stanvoring the party of the incumbent presidards, cross-equation restrictions are implied for
dent in the presidential election taking
parameters of the two equations. I impose and
in quarter t (Vt is observed only in
place
test these parameter restrictions, in effect testing
when there is a presidential
quarters
the hypothesis of "behavioral consistency" for
election),
voters and survey respondents. If the hypothesis
St= a measure of economic performance for
is rejected, the validity of testing propositions
quarter t (described in more detail beabout voting behavior with approval ratings data
low),
would be seriously questioned. If it is not rea vector of other exogenous variables afXt=
jected, we could be more confident of inferences
fecting
approval ratings,
about voting behavior which are based on apa
vector
of other exogenous variables afZt=
proval ratings data.
fecting
presidential
votes,
An econometric model suitable for jointly anaand
are
scalar
a,
b,
a,
,3
parameters,
lyzing vote and approval ratings equations is dec
of
and
y
are
vectors
parameters.
scribed in section I below. This is essentially a
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model in
The error terms, et and ut, are assumed to
which there are unequal numbers of observations
have a bivariate normal density function fe, l
for the two equations.5 Section II describes the
(et, ut) such that E(et) = E(ut) = 0, E(et) =
specifications of equations to explain approval
E(u2) = o-u2, and E(etut) = oeu for all t. All
ratings and votes and section III provides empiricross-time error covariances are initially assumed
cal results. Conclusions are discussed in sec=
=

tion IV.

4Hibbs (1987) and others have illustrated that approval
ratings and election outcomes are correlated, but have not
tested the hypothesis that economic events affect approval
ratings and votes in a consistent manner.
5 Schmidt (1977) has described estimation techniques for the
SUR model when there are unequal numbers of observations.
Parks (1967) describes methods for handling serially correlated errors in the SUR context. Also see Anderson (1957) on
issues related to maximum likelihood estimation methods
when there are missinigobservations.

to equal zero: E(etet-i)
E(utut_i)
E(etut-,)
= E(utet_1) = 0 for all t and for i 0 0. I later

alter the model to permit serially correlated errors in the approval ratings equation.
Economic performance, St, will itself be a
function of several economic indicators. Previous
work has suggested that inflation, unemployment,
and economic growth are of interest to voters, so
a simple measure of economic performance could
take the following form:
+
+ 3Y.t
St =c115t&?2Ut
&?w

(2)
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In this equation Pt is the absolute value of a
moving average of quarterly inflation rates prevailing under the incumbent president up until
period t, and UJ and Yt are similar averages of
unemployment and real GNP growth rates. The
wois are parameters which indicate the relative
importance of the various economic performance
variables.
Substituting (2) into (la) and (lb) the two
equations of the model can be rewritten:

a + b((0lPt + &j2Ut+ &o3Yt)+ cXt + et

At

(3a)
Vt

a? +I3(wPo?t

+ 02Ut +?03t)

+ yZt ut?
+

(3b)
Note that the wois appear in both vote and
approval equations, implying that voters and poll
respondents use the same standards in evaluating
economic performance. This restriction can be
tested empirically. Also note that the scale of the
linear combination defining St is arbitrary; I will
normalize by setting b = 1 in equation (3a). The
likelihood function for the model described above
is provided in appendix 1.
Serial correlation of the errors is a potential
problem for the approval ratings equation, and
the estimation procedure should account for this
possibility. Although errors within an administration's tenure are probably correlated there is
little reason to believe that the error for the last
quarter of an outgoing administration will be
correlated with the error for the succeeding administration in its first quarter in office. Letting Et
represent the composite error term for the approval ratings equation, I respecify the error process as follows:
= PDtEt -I + et,

(4)
where Dt equals one if the administration in
office at time t was also in office at time t - 1,
and is otherwise equal to zero, p is the autocorrelation coefficient, and et is an error term with the
properties attributed to it earlier in equation (la).
With a data transformation analogous to that
used in handling standard first order serial correlation problems, the approval ratings equation
can be rewritten in a form in which serial correlation is absent. Consider an equation:
et

Yt ==f(X

,0)

+

Et,
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where Et follows the process described by (4).
Then the transformed equation:
yt - pDtyt- 1 = t(Xt, 0) - pDtf (Xt- 1, 0) + et

(5)
has a serially uncorrelated error term. Assuming
that the approval ratings equation (3a) has been
transformed in this manner (given an estimate of
p),6 the remaining parameters of equations (3a)
and (3b) can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method.7
II.

Specifying Vote and Approval Ratings
Functions

In specifying vote and approval ratings equations I have adopted a conventional approach to
measuring economic performance. Following
Kramer, Fair, and Hibbs I include recent observations of unemployment, real GNP growth, and
the absolute value of inflation as performance
indicators. I define these variables as 4-quarter
moving averages (including the current quarter)
except for early term observations for new administrations. If a new administration has been in
office for less than 4 quarters, only within-term
observations are used to construct the moving
averages.' Again following convention, I hypothesize that voters and poll respondents reward
higher income growth and penalize higher unemployment and higher inflation.
The simple retrospective voting behavior represented by this specification is compatible with
voter naivete and myopia as assumed by Nordhaus (1975) in his model of the political business
cycle. Although the assumption of voter naivete
has been questioned, recent research has shown
that similar retrospective voting patterns may also
be compatible with rational voting, particularly
6Note that the cross-equation error correlation permitted
by the model is restricted to the contemporaneous correlation
between et and ut.
7To obtain an estimate of the autocorrelation coefficient p,
I first estimated the approval ratings equation by OLS, and
constructed the OLS residuals e. I then regressed t, on
where Dt is defined as in (4). The coefficient on
D e
Dtet-, provides an estimate of p. This estimate is used to
transform the approval ratings equation as described in (5).
The maximum likelihood routine in TSP was then used to
estimate the remaining parameters of the model.
8 In this analysis I consider the Kennedy-Johnson and
Nixon-Ford years as single administrations.

316

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

when voters are imperfectly informed.9 Models
specifying alternative interpretations of voter sophistication have also been proposed in the literature,10 but I will not pursue the issues posed by
those models here.
Noneconomic variables are also included in
each equation, following conventional practice.
My selections of noneconomic variables for the
approval ratings equation follow the example of
Chappell and Keech (1985) closely."1 To account
for an early-term "honeymoon," I include six
dummy variables

(POSTk,

k = 1,2,

..

., 6) indi-

cating each of the first six quarters in office for a
new administration. The series of dummies permits a flexible honeymoon effect which can persist until mid-term elections are imminent. I also
include several variables to control for potentially
important political events. Dummies are included
to capture the effects of two major scandals, the
Watergate events under Nixon (WATERG) and
the Iran-Contra events under Reagan (IRAN).
To control for Vietnam war effects, I include a
variable indicating the number killed in action
during the quarter (KILLED). I also allow intercepts to differ for each president in the sample to
reflect differences in their personal characteristics, ideological stances, leadership qualities, likely
opponents, and other attributes.
My specification for the voting equation is similar to that adopted by Fair. I include a dummy
variable (DEMO) for the party of the incumbent
president to detect any persistent bias favoring
one party over the other. I also include a dummy
(DPER) to indicate that an incumbent president

9 Kramer's original work defended retrospective voting as
reasonable given the costs of information gathering and processing, and Beck (forthcoming) has extended this argument
while adopting a principal-agent perspective. Alesina and
Cukierman (1987), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990)
propose models in which rational voters can learn about the
competence or preferences of incumbents by observing past
and current performance, and Peltzman (1988) observes that
rational voters should reward past and current income growth
if the income changes are permanent.
to Chappell (1983), Chappell and Keech (1985), Minford and
Peel (1982), Peltzman (1988), Richards (1988), and Richards
and Garman (1988) have proposed models in which voters are
assumed to have some understanding of macroeconomic constraints. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) develop a model in
which voters are explicitly prospective and are aware of partisan reputations for differing macroeconomic policy rules.
I A detailed discussion of specification issues related to
noneconomic variables is provided in that paper.

is running for reelection.12 Precise variable definitions and data sources are listed in appendix 2.
III. Empirical Results
The sample for the approval ratings equation
begins with the first quarter of 1953 and continues to the fourth quarter of 1988, and the sample
for the voting equation includes presidential elections from 1948 to 1988.'3 Table 1 presents three
sets of estimates for the system. Single equation
estimates are presented first. The voting equation
is estimated by OLS, while the approval ratings
equation is estimated by a two-step procedure to
correct for serial correlation of the form specified
in equation (4). I next provide maximum likelihood estimates of the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model without imposing cross-equation restrictions on the ctis. Finally, I provide
SUR estimates which impose the restriction of
equal wis across equations.
For both voting and approval ratings equations
single equation estimates are similar to the unrestricted SUR model estimates. In the approval
ratings equation all coefficient signs follow hypothesized patterns, and most coefficients differ
significantly from zero at conventional significance levels. In particular, coefficients for GNP
growth and inflation are significant at the 0.01
significance level for two-tailed tests in both sets
of estimates. The unemployment coefficient is
appropriately negative and moderately large, but
is not significantly different from zero.
In the voting equation, economic variables
again have expected signs, but none is significant
in the OLS estimation. In SUR results, coefficients on GNP growth and inflation have smaller estimated standard errors and are now
significant; the unemployment coefficient is now
positive but remains insignificant.14 The crossequation error covariance for the SUR model is
positive and significantly different from zero. This
suggests that efficiency gains from the SUR estimation technique are potentially important.
12
Fair considers Ford a non-incumbent in constructing this
variable; however, I have coded Ford as an incumbent.
13
Some approval ratings were available for the Truman
years; however, polls were not reported with regularity until
the Eisenhower presidency.
14
The standard errors reported here are estimated by the
method proposed by White (1982). Inferences are robust to
some specification errors when this method is employed.
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TABLE

1.-ESTIMATED
(ASYMPTOTIC

VOTING

AND

APPROVAL

t-STATISTICS

Estimate

EQUATIONS

Unrestricted SUR
Estimates

Single Equation
Estimates
Parameter

RATINGS

IN PARENTHESES)

Restricted SUR
Estimates

Estimate

t-statistic

Estimate

t-statistic

15.612

(2.190)a

11.701

(1.430)

21.303
0.535
69.176
66.825
61.119
62.504
67.564
61.125
64.112
12.785
13.631
9.575
8.138
8.392
2.244
- 1.573
-14.790
- 5.690
- 1.726
0.886
- 0.981

(7.124)a

t-statistic

Ueu

Approval Equation
Parameters
2

p
EISEN
KENNEDY
JOHNSON
NIXON
FORD
CARTER
REAGAN
POST,
POST2
POST3
POST4
POST5
POST6
KILLED
WATERG
IRAN
P
Y
U
Voting Equation
Parameters
0_u2

CONSTANT
DEMO
DPER
P
Y
U

p

24.098
0.535
69.094
66.714
61.487
62.890
64.447
60.580
63.582
12.788
13.699
9.556
- 8.888
8.760
2.404
- 1.872
- 16.433
- 5.624
- 1.591
0.901
- 1.003
21.377
55.350
- 4.105
6.504
- 0.951
0.935
- 0.673
1.0

(I6.296)a
(11.840)a
(12.061)a
( 1.464)a
(8.585)a
(8.597)a
(9.411)a
(5.855)a
(5.844)a
(3.985)a
(3.747)a
(3.837)a
(1.241)
(-1.805)a
(-3.788)a
(-1.430)
(3.379)a
(3.496)a
(- 1.299)

16.503
49.112
1.671
2.951
- 1.346
1.189
0.418
1.0

(7.092)a
(- 1.091)
(1.738)a
(-1.145)
(1.111)
(- 0.495)

(11.141)a
(10.070)a
(10.063)a
(10.441)a
(6.672)a
(7.548)a
(7.605)a
(4.060)a
(5.081)a
(4.710)a
(4.722)a
(4.219)a
(1.452)
(-1.899)a
(-3.259)a
(-1.684)a
(-3.308)a
(3.840)a
(-0.989)
(2.029)a
(10.649)a
(0.574)
(1.173)
(-2.960)a
(2.741)a
(0.504)

21.265
0.535
66.785
63.340
57.864
59.233
61.772
56.461
59.192
12.911
13.883
9.793
8.516
8.635
2.319
- 1.481
- 15.725
- 5.162
- 1.551
0.940
- 0.507

(10.908)a
(9.552)a
(9.193)a
(7.755)a
(7.073)a
(5.797)a
(6.829)a
(4.191)a
(5.331)a
(4.924)a
(5.255)a
(4.457)a
(1.512)
(-1.613)a
(3.399)a
(-1.699)a
(-2.766)a
(4.389)a
(-0.509)

13.154
54.319
- 0.476
5.289
- 1.551
0.940
- 0.507
0.823

(2.533)a
(13.754)a
(- 0.103)
(1.796)a
(-2.766)a
(4.389)a
(- 0.509)
(2.176)a

(6.762)a

Log-likelihood
function

-

-

450.21

-451.19

Note: Wald test of restrictions imposing equality of the co,s across equations: Aw = 2.73 < 4.61 = X2y)(2). The
restrictions are not rejected. Likelihood ratio test of restrictions imposing equality of the :o,s across equations:
ALR = 1.978 < 4.61 = X029)(2). The restrictions are not rejected.
'
Significant at the 0.10 level.

Although the impacts of economic variables
are qualitatively similar in the approval and voting equations, there are some notable differences
in magnitudes. In the approval equation, the inflation coefficient is almost twice as large as the
GNP growth coefficient, but in the voting equation the two coefficients are comparable in magnitude. Despite the apparent differences, a Wald
test cannot reject the hypothesis of equal wois
across equations at the 0.10 significance level.
This result is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test
based on restricted and unrestricted SUR estimates. Given the paucity of voting equation ob-

servations and the resulting low power of these
tests, we should interpret such results cautiously
-a failure to reject the restrictions does not
imply that we should accept them. A "failure to
reject" the restrictions is perhaps best considered
a minimal requirement for researchers who are
inclined to impose such restrictions a priori.
SUR estimates which impose the restriction of
equal woisconfirm the importance of GNP growth
and inflation as performance indicators; the unemployment coefficient is again insignificant. In
the voting equation, ,3 (measuring the overall
sensitivity of voting to economic performance) is
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positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that the linear combination of performance measures does influence voting. The estimate of ,3 is less than one, but not significantly
so. A value of ,3 less than one indicates that
economic performance has a smaller percentage
impact on voting than on approval ratings. This is
reasonable if voting decisions depend more heavily on omitted prospective variables (like policy
positions) than approval ratings do.
Robustness of the results to alternative specifications is, as always, an issue of concern. In this
paper I have not searched for a "best" specification of economic performance indicators;
rather I have selected a specification which is
broadly representative of the existing literature.15
Whether alternative models of voter behavior
would lead to different implications about the
consistency of the behavior patterns producing
voting and approval rates provides a question for
future research efforts. I have, however, done
some sensitivity testing with alternative specifications of the noneconomic variables in the approval ratings equation. These tests will be briefly
described here; detailed results are available from
the author upon request.
I first considered variations in the handling of
honeymoon effects and political events. Omitting
any or all of the political events variables has no
substantive effects on reported results, nor does
replacing the series of honeymoon dummies with
a declining linear trend over the early quarters of
a president's tenure. In each case, the cross-equation restrictions implying behavioral consistency
cannot be rejected.
I next replaced the president-specific intercepts
with a common intercept and a party dummy.
Since a Wald test based on the original unrestricted SUR estimates does not reject the hypothesis of equal presidential intercepts, this represents a reasonable reformulation of the model.
Coefficient estimates are similar to those reported earlier, but the impacts of inflation relative to growth are a bit larger in the approval
equation and a bit smaller in the voting equation,
making the differences between equations more
pronounced. More importantly, estimated stan15

I have also estimated a model dropping the insignificant
unemployment variable, obtaining results similar to those
described here.

dard errors for the coefficients of economic variables in the approval equation'are notably smaller,
and the hypothesis of behavioral consistency is
now rejected at the 0.01 significance level.16 This
result considerably strengthens earlier suggestions of stronger inflation aversion in poll responses than in voting.
In further sensitivity testing, I have estimated
the model for a sample which adds the eight
elections from 1916 to 1944 to the voting equation. Under the assumption that voting was stable
over the 1916 to 1988 period, the consistency of
voting and approval ratings is again rejected-and
the polls again indicate greater inflation aversion.
This adds force to the view that voting and poll
responses differ, but it is contingent on the questionable assumption of voting function stability
over the pre-war and post-war periods. The test
of behavioral consistency in this case confounds
differences between voting and poll responses
with variations in voting behavior over time. Although the hypothesis of a stable voting function
cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels,
there are at least suggestions of voting
instability."7 Thus, while the sensitivity tests
strengthen the case against the hypothesis of behavioral consistency, conclusions must remain
somewhat clouded.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I have jointly estimated equations
explaining presidential voting and presidential
approval ratings, treating the equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers
of observations. My results are broadly consistent
with previous voting and approval rating studies
of Fair, Hibbs, and others. GNP growth and
inflation appear to matter for both voters and
poll respondents; evidence of unemployment effects is weak. Since the results are qualitatively
16
For the Wald test of the hypothesis of equal w1s across
equations we obtain A, = 13.128 > 9.21 = Xo299(2); the hypothesis is rejected.
17
For a Wald test of the hypothesis of stable coefficients for
the economic variables in pre-war and post-war periods, we
obtain Aw = 3.60 < 6.25 = Xo.90(3);the hypothesis is not rejected. However, in results for the extended sample, the
unemployment coefficient in the voting equation has an implausible positive sign. If unemployment is dropped from the
model, then inflation coefficients differ significantly over the
pre-war and post-war periods, and stability of the vote function is rejected.
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similar for voters and poll respondents, it appears
that the poll results provide meaningful evaluations which are related to voting decisions.
The results also point to some differences in
the behavior of voters and poll respondents, however. Estimates consistently, if not strongly, indicate that poll respondents are more concerned
with inflation and less concerned with GNP
growth than voters are. The hypothesis that voters and poll respondents employ identical standards in evaluating economic performance is not
rejected in the original specification, but can be
rejected in some plausible reformulations of the
model. Given these results it is reasonable to
remain cautious regarding the interchangeability
of voting data and poll data.
When considering why voting and approval ratings might differ in their responses to economic
indicators, distinctions between retrospective and
prospective considerations are likely to be important. The focus of the approval question on job
performance may encourage retrospective evaluations, while voting may be more heavily influenced by prospective criteria. If recent GNP
growth is a better "leading indicator" than the
rate of inflation, then the results reported here
are consistent with a more prospective outlook by
voters.
APPENDIX 1
Likelihood Function for the Voting and Approval
Ratings Model
Below I provide the log-likelihood function for individual
observations under 3 cases: (1) the presidential vote is observed, but an approval rating is not observed, (2) there is no
presidential election, but an approval rating is observed, and
(3) both the presidential vote and an approval rating are
observed. First define e * and u * as follows:
t = V-

a - (IP,

ett = At-aY-

(

+ W2U1+ w3Yt)

-

IPt + W2Ut + W3Yt)

=

-0.5 log(2 7rwo-2) - O.5(u* /o

)2.

Case II. Vote not observed, approval rating observed:
log(L,) = -0.5 log(27o-e2) -0.5(e,

log(L,) = -log(27v)
-(u2/2D)

/ )2.

=

- 0.5 log(D) - o-)/22D) (e/ k)2
(u

)2 +

(o-,,/D)e*u*u

The log-likelihood function for the sample is the sum of the
log-likelihoods for the individual observations.

APPENDIX 2
Data Definitions and Sources
V

The incumbent party's percentage of the 2-party
vote in a presidential election. Source: Fair
(1978) and the Statistical Abstract of the United
States.

A

The percentage of respondents answering "approve" to the Gallup Survey question: "Do you
approve or disapprove of the way that - is
handling his job as president?" Source: various
issues of the Gallup Report, the Gallup Opinion
Index and the Gallup Political Index. This variable is computed as an average across all polls
conducted within a quarter. I have interpolated
to obtain values for three quarters in which no
polls were reported.

POSTk

A dummy variable equal to 1 in the kth quarter
of a new administration's tenure (k = 1, . . ., 6);
else equal to 0.
A series of dummy variables indicating, respectively, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Each
dummy is equal to 1 for quarters during the
indicated presidency and is otherwise equal
to 0.

EISEN
KENNEDY
JOHNSON
NIXON
FORD
CARTER
REAGAN
WATERG

A dummy variable equal to 1 for the period
1973 4 to 1974 2 (beginning with the firing of
Archibald Cox and continuing until Nixon's resignation); else equal to 0.

IRAN

A dummy variable equal to 0.5 for 1986 4,
equal to 1 for 1987 1 to 1987 4, and otherwise
equal to 0. Note: Only one of the two polls
administered in 1986 4 came after the revelation of the arms-for-hostages negotiations with
Iran. The congressional Iran-Contra committee
submitted its final report in 1987 4.

KILLED

The number (in thousands) of servicemen killed
in action in Vietnam in the quarter. Sources:
Milstein (1974) and the StatisticalAbstractof the
United States

P

If the current administration has been in office
at least 4 quarters, P is the absolute value of a
4-quartef moving average of quarterly inflation
rates. If the current administration has been in
office for less than 4 quarters, P is the average
of the absolute values of inflation rates within
the administration's term. The inflation rate is
computed as an annualized percentage change
in the GNP deflator. Source: CITIBASE data
tape.

YXt

The log-likelihood function for observations in the various
cases is provided below:
Case I. Vote observed, approval rating not observed:
log(L1)

Case III. Vote observed, approval rating observed: Let D
(o22 - os2), then

CX,
-
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U

If the current administration has been in office
at least 4 quarters, U is a 4-quarter moving
average of the quarterly percentage unemployment rate. If the current administration has
been in office for less than 4 quarters, U is the
average of unemployment rates within the administration's term. Source: CITIBASE data
tape.

Y

If the current administration has been in office
at least 4 quarters, Y is a 4-quarter moving
average of the annualized percentage quarterly
growth rate of real GNP. If the current administration has been in office for less than 4
quarters, Y is the average of the growth rates
within an administration's term. Source:
CITIBASE data tape.

DEMO

A dummy variable equal to 1 when the incumbent president is a Democrat; else equal to 0.

DPER

A dummy variable equal to 1 in quarters when
an incumbent president runs for reelection; else
equal to 0.
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